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Mazza v. Huffaker: Sex with the Patient's Spouse is
Negligent Psychiatric Treatment
Psychiatric malpractice is one of the fastest growing areas of professional
liability.' Although patients long have been able to sue their doctors for injuries occurring during the course of their medical treatment, 2 psychiatrists traditionally have been free from malpractice litigation. 3 This relative immunity
has existed for several reasons. The psychiatric profession's diverse therapeutic techniques have made it difficult to establish definite standards of care. In
addition, trials involving psychiatric treatments often involve complex medical, legal, and factual issues and rely on conflicting expert testimony. 4 This
complexity and confusion, which reflects the subjectiveness of mental health
standards, has made it difficult for a patient to win a verdict from a jury of
laypersons. 5 The recent surge in psychiatric malpractice litigation, however,
has included many cases involving factual issues that any juror could compre-6
hend and malpractice issues that do not generate conflicting expert testimony.
These latter cases have included the prescription, as medical treatment, of sex7
ual relations between the psychiatrist and the patient.
Sexual relations between patient and psychiatrist always have been recognized as a violation of medical ethics.8 Civil liability, however, was established only recently by the 1968 case of Nicholson v. Han.9 Since Nicholson
such civil litigation has increased; there now exists an established malpractice
cause of action for a patient whose psychiatrist has sex with her as part of
prescribed therapy. 10 Although in the early 1970s sexual relations were someI.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Wilkinson, PsychiatricMa/practice: IdentfyingAreas ofLiability, TRIAL, Oct. 1982, at 73.
J. GUNTHER, THE MALPRACTITIONERS 3 (1978).
Rothblatt & Leroy, Avoiding PsychiatricMa/practice, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 260, 260 (1973).
Id
Id
For example, in some cases the jury has had to determine whether the psychiatrist actu-

ally had sex with his patient. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
7. Gentry, PsychiatricLiability. Abuse of the Therapist-PatientRelationship, TRIAL, May

1980, at 26; see infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. One recent survey indicated that five to
ten percent of the nation's psychotherapists have had some form of physical contact with female
patients under the guise of medical treatment. Dietz, Pyschotherapists,Patientsand Sex, Boston
Globe, Jan. 31, 1982, at I, col. I.
8. The Hippocratic Oath of the Physician states, "Whatever houses I may visit, I will come
for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particu... (quoted in 1982 MED. TRIAL
lar of sexual relations with both female and male persons.
TECH. Q. 201, 203). The ethical code of the American Psychiatric Association expressly states,
"Sexual activity with a patient is unethical." Lange & Hirsh, LegalProblemsof ntimate Therapy,
1982 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 201, 203.

9. 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968) (recognizing cause of action but denying recovery because the action had been abolished); see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1393 (1970).
10. See Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980) (psychiatrist liable
for medical malpractice after inducing the patient to have sex under the guise of psychiatric treatment); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976) (psychiatrist who had sexual
intercourse with patient as part of treatment was liable for medical malpractice). See also 25
ATLA L. REP. 98 (1982) (discussing cases involving malpractice claims based on psychiatrists
sexually abusing their patients); Gentry, supra note 7, at 26-29. Because the reported cases dealing
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times advocated as proper therapy," the American Psychiatric Association
has adopted' 2 the view of experts in the psychiatric field today that sexual
contact between patient and psychiatrist harms the patient and departs from

accepted standards of medical practice. 13 The courts have recognized the
mental damage resulting from this type of treatment'

to patients injured by it.'

4

and have granted relief

5

The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently decided its first malprac-

tice case based on a psychiatrist's sexual endeavors. 16 Unlike most recent
cases in other jurisdictions, 17 however, Mazza v. Huffaker involved sexual re-

lations between the psychiatrist and the patient's spouse. Mazza involved Dr.
Huffaker, a psychiatrist who for four years had been treating Mr. Mazza for
manic depressive psychosis. During this continuing treatment, Huffaker also
began to see Mrs. Mazza on a professional basis. Eventually, this relationship
became personal. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mazza moved out of his home, but
continued treatment with Huffaker. One night, he went home and discovered
Huffaker having sexual intercourse with Mrs. Mazza. It was out of this incident that the lawsuit arose.1 8 The jury found Huffaker liable for medical malpractice for having sex with his patient's wife.
The court of appeals affirmed. 19 In holding that a patient can suffer
mental and emotional harm sufficient for a malpractice action by witnessing
the psychiatrist's private sexual actions with another, the court extended the
rationale in most sexual intimacy cases. 20 Furthermore, as a result of the jury
instructions and special verdict, the decision may have substantial effects on
general medical malpractice principles in North Carolina.

The jury was instructed to find malpractice if it determined that any one

21
of the following was true: (1) that defendant violated the standard of care;

with sexual relations between psychiatrist and patient have involved male psychiatrists and female
patients, this note will refer to psychiatrists as men and patients as women.
11. See Lange & Hirsh, supra note 8, at 204-05; Riskin, SexualRelations Between Psychotherapists and Their Patients: Toward Research or Restraint, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1000 (1979).
12. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 895, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (1976) (Markowitz, J.,
concurring).
13. I d; Riskin, supra note 11, at 1012.
14. Sex as treatment aggravates a patient's mental condition. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d
891, 902, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 596 (1976); Anonymous v. Berry, No. 78-8182-CA, Division H (Fla.
Duval County Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 1979), noted in 22 ATLA L. REP. 447, 473 (1979). The sexual
abuse also can destroy the patient's family and married life. Walker v. Parsons (Cal. App. San
Diego Super. Ct. July 7, 1981), noted in 68 A.B.A. J. 1353, 1354 (1982). The sex also delays the
patient's recovery from her original mental illness. Combs v. Silverman, No. LE 596 (Va.-Richmond Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1982), noted in 25 ATLA L. REP. 98, 98-100 (1982).
15. See cases cited infra note 14. See generally 25 ATLA L. REP. 98 (1982).
16. Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983).
17. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
18. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 175-76, 300 S.E.2d at 837.
19. 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983).
20. An argument can be made that the "other person" must be a relative because the trial
testimony was limited to references to sexual acts between the psychiatrist and the patient's relative. Id at 177, 300 S.E.2d at 838.
21. Record at 198, Mazza, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983) (the jury was asked to
determine whether defendant failed to use that degree of professional learning, skill, and ability
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(2) that defendant failed to recognize and guard against the transference or
counter-transference phenomena in his treatment of Mrs. Mazza; (3) that defendant abandoned Mr. Mazza as a patient; or (4) that defendant continued to
treat Mr. Mazza after becoming emotionally and sexually involved with Mr.
Mazza's wife.22 The jury rendered a special verdict finding that defendant
committed medical malpractice in his treatment of Mr. Mazza,2 3 but the verdict did not reveal the basis of the finding. Thus, each of the grounds enumerated in the jury instructions arguably constitutes malpractice in North
Carolina. Such a decision could have a profound effect on North Carolina
malpractice principles. First, by finding no error in the jury's determination
that Huffaker's conduct violated the standard of care, the court created a
stricter duty and higher standard of care for psychiatrists than for other medical doctors. Psychiatrists now may be held liable for private actions, unrelated
to the treatment of the claimant.z4 Second, allowing a jury to determine that
Huffaker was liable in malpractice to Mr. Mazza for treatment rendered to
Mrs. Mazza created a unique cause of action on behalf of a third person. 25
Finally, the remaining grounds for malpractice coupled with certain rulings
represent an unprecedented liberalization of the court's attitude toward a malpractice claimant.
Mazza's primary impact on North Carolina law is the adoption of a
higher standard of care for psychiatrists than for other doctors. To establish
liability for malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the psychiatrist's care was
not in accordance with the standards of practice among members of his profession with similar training and experience in the same or a similar community.2 6 Traditionally, malpractice has been based on the negligent "treatment
or care" administered to the plaintiff by the psychiatrist. 27 Mazza, however,
did not involve allegations of negligent "treatment" of plaintiff. Rather, the
negligent conduct was private, unrelated to any medical treatment, and was
exercised with a person other than plaintiff. Thus, Mazza differs from cases in
other jurisdictions in which courts have held that negligence only arises from
conduct performed as part of the treatment or employment.2 8 For example, in
that others similarly situated ordinarily possess or whether defendant used his position of trust
and confidence to harm his patient).
22. Id For a definition of transference, see infra text accompanying note 36.
23. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 173, 300 S.E.2d at 836.
24. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981) provides:
Defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless the trier of fact is satisfied ... that the care of such health care provider was not in accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar communities.
27. See supra notes 10-15; see generally Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposalfor
the Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Service, 58 B.U.L. REv. 391 (1978).

28. E.g., City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965) (police
officer stopped plaintiff for speeding and then raped her in his police car, held that the officer's
employer was not vicariously liable since the rape was not within the scope of the officer's employment); Hess v. Frank, 47 A.D.2d 889, 367 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975) (psychiatrist had uttered abusive

1440

NORTH CAROLINA LW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Hess v. Frank2 9 a New York court held that although the psychiatrist's conduct would cause mental anguish to the patient, he could not be guilty of malhe complained was unrelated to the medical
practice if the conduct of which
30
treatment being rendered.
Mazza cited the unique psychiatrist-patient relationship and the corresponding psychiatrist's duties as justification for its ruling that Huffaker's conduct was malpractice. 3 1 The psychiatrist's duty to maintain the patient's trust
and confidence was recognized as absolutely essential to the effectiveness of
the therapy rendered. 32 Although all doctors have the duty to maintain a patient's trust and confidence, 33 this trust is not as essential to the effectiveness of
physical treatment as it is for mental therapy. Thus, a breach of trust arising
out of conduct unrelated to the treatment should not make a nonpsychiatrist
liable for malpractice. 34 Similarly, a doctor's personal activities should not be
restricted by the threat of malpractice unless the activities would harm the
professional treatment being rendered. Limiting Mazza to psychiatrists would
adhere to this proposition.
The second major effect of Mazza is the creation of a unique third-party
medical malpractice cause of action. The court allowed Mr. Mazza to recover
on a malpractice claim arising from treatment Huffaker rendered to Mrs.
Mazza while she was his patient. The court of appeals found no error in the
trial court's instruction that the jury must find Huffaker guilty of malpractice
in his treatment of Mr. Mazza if Huffaker "failed to recognize and guard
against the transference or counter-transference phenomenon" 35 between himself and Mrs. Mazza while she was a patient.
Transference and counter-transference are common phenomena in psychiatric therapy. Transference occurs when the patient transfers emotions the
patient has towards someone else to the psychiatrist. Counter-transference occurs when the psychiatrist transfers feelings that the psychiatrist has towards
language to patient during a regularly scheduled therapy session; the language was found not to
be part of the treatment and thus not professional misconduct).
29. 47 A.D.2d 889, 367 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975).
30. Id
31. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38. See also D. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PsYcHATRismS 43 (1973). Cf.Whitehurst v. Boehm, 41 N.C. App. 670, 674, 255
S.E.2d 761, 764 (1979) (same rules govern duty and liability for physicians and surgeons). No preMazza North Carolina case had held a psychiatrist to a higher standard than other doctors. A
special duty for psychiatrists, however, has been advocated by medical experts and other commentators. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38; D. DAWIDOFF, supra, at 43;
Dawidoff, Insanity, Intimacy andInfidelity: Trends in PsychiatricMalpractice,TRIAL, June 1977, at

27.
32. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38.
33. Id at 176, 300 S.E.2d at 837.
34. The doctor should be held liable for his actions under other causes of action that would
be available to the patient. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
35. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 180, 300 S.E.2d at 840. The court attempted to justify the jury
instruction by claiming that its purpose was to enable the jury to determine whether Huffaker and
Mrs. Mazza had sexual relations. Id at 180-81, 300 S.E.2d at 840. If this was the instruction's
purpose, however, the instruction could simply have read, "Do you find that Mrs. Mazza and Dr.
Huflaker had sexual relations?" Using the phenomenon as a basis for the jury's findings resulted

in granting Mr. Mazza a malpractice action for a wrong done to his wife, not to him.
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someone else to his patient. 36 The psychiatrist's abuse of the transference phe-

nomena gives the patient a cause of action for malpractice. 37 In Walker v.

Parsons38 a California psychiatrist had the female patient transfer her feelings
concerning her husband and family to him239 He then abused the transference

by making the patient believe he loved her and by having sexual relations with
claim for this abuse and was awarded
her. The patient brought a malpractice
40

4.6 million dollars in damages.

The transference and counter-transference cases establish that a patient
whose psychiatrist abuses the transference has a malpractice action against the

psychiatrist. In Mazza, however, the psychiatrist-patient relationship existed
between Huffaker and Mrs. Mazza, not Mr. Mazza. Mr. Mazza was therefore

given the right to pursue a malpractice claim under a cause of action that

traditionally belonged to Mrs. Mazza.4 1 Thus, Mazza expands the scope of

transference cases by holding that the spouse of the patient also will have a
cause of action for malpractice. This result is unprecedented.

Although a husband should be granted relief if he suffers from his wife's
psychiatrist abusing the transference, no justification exists for allowing that

recovery under a malpractice claim. The husband does not have a doctorpatient relationship in the rendering of the negligent treatment (the abuse of

transference). 4 2 Allowing the husband to recover for malpractice violates the
longstanding principle that a doctor-patient relationship must exist to main-

tain a malpractice suit.43 In addition, a third-party action gives rise to the
possibility of two parties recovering against a defendant under one cause of

action. If the wife and husband both choose to sue a doctor for abuse of the
transference phenomenon, they will be able to do so, each recovering under a

malpractice claim that should be the wife's alone.44

One jurisdiction has allowed a husband to recover against his wife's doctor as a result of the doctor's negligent treatment, but the recovery was not
based on malpractice. The California Supreme Court recognized that a hus36. Id at 180, 300 S.E.2d at 840.
37. See Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (psychiatrist mishandled
the transference phenomenon, stimulated patient's romantic involvement with him, triggering her
divorce and destruction of her family life; court held that patient had a malpractice action); Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257 (Q.B.) (psychiatrist permitted social contacts to intrude upon his
professional treatment of patient, causing her to become suicidal when he stopped the relationship; defendant held guilty of malpractice), aft'd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (C.A. 1961).
38. (Cal. App. San Diego Super. Ct. July 7, 1981), notedin 68 A.B.A.J. 1353, 1354 (1982). See
also Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 77; 24 ATLA L. REP. 290, 295-97 (1981).
39. Id
40. Id
41. Mrs. Mazza also was seeing Dr. Huffaker as a patient. Their psychiatrist-patient relationship was independent of the relationship between Mr. Mazza and Huffaker. Thus, if Mrs. Mazza
had been subjected to negligent treatment by Huffaker, she, not her husband, should bring the
malpractice claim.
42. Although Mr. Mazza and Dr. Huffaker had a psychiatrist-patient relationship, it did not
encompass the treatment being rendered to Mrs. Mazza. Thus, Dr. Huffaker did not owe Mr.
Mazza a psychiatrist-patient duty.
43. See Easter v. Lexington Memorial Hosp., 303 N.C. 303, 305-06, 278 S.E.2d 253, 255
(1981).
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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band had a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a
doctor's erroneous diagnosis that the wife had syphilis resulted in the breakup
of their marriage.45 The court held that the doctor owed the husband a duty
to exercise due care in diagnosing his wife since the risk of harm from a misdiagnosis was reasonably foreseeable.4 6 The court also held that the husband
had a cause of action for loss of consortium occasioned by the emotional in47
jury to his wife that resulted from the negligent diagnosis.
The California case is analogous to Mazza. In each, the negligent medical treatment of the wife contributed to a breakup of the marriage, resulting in
severe emotional harm to the husband. Neither husband had a doctor-patient
relationship related to the negligent medical treatment. Under the Mazza
analysis, the husband has a malpractice cause of action. Under the California
rule, separate tort actions alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress
and loss of consortium are the proper causes of action. Mr. Mazza could have
sought redress for Huffaker's actions under any of the following claims: (1)
negligent infliction of emotional distress; 48 (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 49 (3) loss of consortium; 50 (4) criminal conversation; 5' or (5)
breach of contract.5 2 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has
stretched medical malpractice principles unnecessarily by allowing Mr. Mazza
to win a verdict by asserting his wife's unasserted claim for abuse of the transference phenomenon.
Mr. Mazza's recovery for a wrong done to him as a result of his wife's
psychiatric treatment may indicate that North Carolina is liberalizing its view
toward malpractice claimants. The case contradicts North Carolina courts'
conservative attitude toward compensating injured persons for adverse medical results.5 3 Certain other rulings in Mazza also portend a more liberal view
toward malpractice claimants and toward malpractice principles in general.
One such ruling was the court of appeals' holding that there was no error in
the trial court's instruction that Huffaker was liable for malpractice if his con54
duct was an "abandonment" of Mr. Mazza as a patient.
It is generally recognized that a doctor who abandons his patient is guilty
45. Mollen v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930-31, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr.

831, 839 (1980).
46. Id
47. Id at 931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.

48. North Carolina long has recognized the torts of negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Stanback v.
Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Morrow v. Kings Dep't Stores, 57 N.C. App. 13,
290 S.E.2d 732, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982). See generally Byrd, Recoveryfor MentalAnguish In North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1980).
49. See supra note 48.
50. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831

(1980).
51. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 874-88 (4th ed. 1971).
52. See Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See
also infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
53. See REP. OF THE N.C. PROF. LIABILITY INS. STUDY COMM'N 3 (Mar. 12, 1976).
54. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 178-79, 300 S.E.2d at 839 (1983); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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of malpractice if injury results. 55 Abandonment is a unilateral act by the medical practitioner and has been found to exist in cases in which the doctor refused to attend a patient, 56 left a patient during an operation,5 7 failed to attend
to a patient despite a promise to do so, 5 8 or discharged a patient prematurely.5 9 Each of these cases involved a doctor's direct action or inaction in
relation to the treatment being rendered. By construing Huffaker's activity
with Mr. Mazza's wife as abandonment, the court recognized that "abandonment" also can be inferred from a doctor's actions that are private and unrelated to the patient's treatment.
This holding also could be construed as a rule that a doctor "abandons"
his patient by acting in conflict with the patient's interest, since these conflicting actions would not be conducive to providing proper health care. This
principle, however, would give the patient a right to restrict his doctor's nonprofessional activity by the threat of a malpractice suit. Such a result unnecessarily expands the scope of negligent malpractice and violates the policies
underlying the cause of action.
Another ruling indicating a more liberal attitude toward malpractice
claimants was the award of damages. Mr. Mazza was awarded $17,000 in
compensatory damages for the cost of medical services rendered to both Mr.
and Mrs. Mazza prior to Huffaker's negligent conduct. 60 These damages were
upheld on appeal. 6 1 The court of appeals stated that all medical treatments
given by Huffaker62were rendered worthless by his subsequent sexual relations
with Mrs. Mazza.
This award is unique in two respects. First, prior to Huffaker no North
Carolina court had awarded as damages the cost of medical treatmentsprior to
the negligent act. To the contrary, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover for medical expenses incurred
prior to the negligence of which he or she complains. 6 3 Mazza may open a
new avenue for plaintiffs seeking malpractice damages. Many innovative arguments now could be made on behalf of plaintiffs suing doctors who have
rendered ongoing treatment. A fatal negligent act by the doctor arguably
would "destroy
or make worthless" all treatment administered up until the
64
negligence.
55. Wilson v. Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950).
56. Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980); Vann v. Harden, 187
Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948).
57. Burnett v. Layman, 133 Tenn. 323, 181 S.W. 157 (1915).
58. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
59. Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967).
60. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 187-88, 300 S.E.2d at 844.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Blaine v. Lyle, 213 N.C. 529, 196 S.E. 833 (1938) (girl who had been treated by doctor for
over one year could not recover expenses incurred for treatment rendered prior to negligent act).
64. A hypothetical situation can demonstrate this point. A patient with a heart condition
must receive treatment regularly over the course of four years. During the last treatment, the
doctor negligently injects the wrong medicine into the patient. As a result the patient must incur a
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The court failed to recognize one important factor in its affirmation of the
award for past medical fees-plaintiff had benefitted from receiving those psychiatric treatments. He was able to work, carry on a family life, and engage in
a relatively normal life during the course of Huffaker's four year treatment.
The award should have been set off by the benefits received by Mr. Mazza.
No subsequent act can make worthless what already was received. 65
The second unique aspect of the compensatory damages award was the
inclusion of Mrs. Mazza's medical expenses. 66 The expenses incurred by Mrs.
Mazza were for treatments she received as a patient of Huffaker, independent
of the treatments Mr. Mazza was receiving. 67 Thus, the award compensates

Mr. Mazza for expenses incurred by another. Here again, the court granted
68
Mr. Mazza relief under a claim exercisable by his wife, not him.
Although husbands long have been able to recover their spouse's medical
expenses, a malpractice claim is not the proper vehicle. Florida allowed a
husband to recover expenses in a breach of contract action when the psychiatrist was found guilty of abusing the counter-transference phenomenon and
causing the wife's suicide. 69 The court held that because the psychiatrist
breached a contract with a patient and destroyed the benefit anticipated from
skillful treatment, the party paying for the patient's care was entitled to recover payments made under the contract. 70 Recovery also was conditioned
expressly on proof that the psychiatrist's breach destroyed the possibility of
rendering beneficial treatments-the wife's subsequent suicide was proof that
the treatments were not beneficial. 7 ' In Mazza, however, there was no finding
that Mrs. Mazza did not benefit from Huffaker's treatments. To the contrary,
testimony at trial tended to show that the treatments received by Mrs. Mazza
72
were helpful.
The award of damages for permanent injury also embodies a more liberal
view toward malpractice claimants. Traditionally, North Carolina has maintained a high threshold of proof to warrant permanent damage instructions. 7 3
The evidence must show with reasonable certainty that the injury is permanent.74 The plaintiff must overcome this burden by the greater weight of the
heart transplant or die. In either situation, Mazza would allow the patient or his estate to recover
all medical expenses that the patient had incurred up to that last treatment.
65. In Hess v. Frank, 47 A.D.2d 889, 367 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975), the court denied a patient's
claim for the cost of past psychiatric treatments. The court held that payments made for treatments rendered were not recoverable.
66. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 187-88, 300 S.E.2d at 844.
67. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
69. Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
70. Id. at 257.
71. Id.
72. Record at 13 1. The testimony tended to show that the treatment was instrumental in Mrs.
Mazza's reconciliation with her father.
73. See, e.g., Caison v. Cliff, 38 N.C. App. 613, 248 S.E.2d 362 (1978).
74. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 326, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965); Caison v. Cliff, 38
N.C. App. 613, 616, 248 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1978).
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evidence. 75 The only evidence in Mazza tending to prove a permanent injury
was testimony by plaintiff's expert that Mr. Mazza never again would be able
to form a medical relationship with a psychiatrist. 76 No expert testified that
this would harm plaintiffs mental health permanently. 77 No doubt the Mazza
evidence implies some pain and suffering. It is doubtful that the limited expert
testimony met the North Carolina Supreme Court's strict standard of proof of
a reasonable certainty of permanent injury.
Two additional rulings by the court of appeals were incorrect. First, the
to
court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to allow an expert witness
78
state an opinion concerning the professional ethics of Huffaker's conduct. It
is well established that in a malpractice action the psychiatrist's liability is
conditioned on a violation of the standard of care.79 Testimony on ethical
standards is irrelevant to establishing negligence and should have been omitted.80 Also, it is possible that the expert's unnecessary testimony on the ethical
standard confused the jurors and caused them to attribute greater credibility to
the expert's other testimony concerning the proper standard of care. The
court's failure to omit the evidence denied defendant's statutory right to a
judgment based on the standard of care in the community, 8 ' and was prejudicial error.
The final error in Mazza was the trial court's instruction that the jury
must find malpractice if it determined that Huffaker continued to treat Mr.
82
Mazza after becoming emotionally and sexually involved with Mrs. Mazza.
This instruction preempted the jury's role by conclusively establishing that the
sexual conduct violated the standard of care. The jury was left with only a
factual question whether the couple had sex, not whether having sex violated
the standard of care. Thus, Huffaker was denied his right to a jury determination of whether he violated the standard of care. Because the instruction had
the same effect as a directed verdict conditioned on a factual finding that the
psychiatrist had sex with the patient's wife, the instruction should have been
ruled prejudicial error.
Mazza significantly expanded medical malpractice principles. Several of
the changes are welcome. Raising the standard of care for psychiatrists,
awarding past medical expenses if offset by the benefits consumed, and decreasing the burden of proof for permanent injury will provide more protec75. Dolan v. Simpson, 269 N.C. 438, 442, 152 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1967).
76. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 185-86, 300 S.E.2d at 843.
77. The North Carolina Supreme Court historically has required expert testimony to establish a reasonable certainty of permanent injury. See, e.g., Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 326,
139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965).
78. The court did not find error in this testimony because the ethical standard was equivalent
to the standard of care. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 183-84, 300 S.E.2d at 842.
79. Id at 174-75, 300 S.E.2d at 837; N.C. GaN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
80. Cf. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (1978) (doctor's breach of the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship not recognized as malpractice even though the conduct was found to be an ethical violation).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981), quoted supra note 26.
82. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 179-80, 300 S.E.2d at 839; see also supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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tion for claimants. Granting third parties a cause of action, defining
"abandonment" of the patient broadly, allowing an expert to prejudice the
jury's decisionmaking role, and giving the trial judge a right to preempt needlessly the jury's charge, however, are not desired results. The supreme court
should take action to overrule these aspects of Mazza. If the court is unwilling
to do so, it should at least limit application of the less desirable results to
unique factual situations such as that occuring inMazza. Such a limited interpretation would diminish their effects on North Carolina malpractice principles since a similar factual pattern is unlikely to occur frequently.
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